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Abstract
In this paper we study the impact of news media and public surveys on the electoral cam-
paigns for political competitions. We present an agent-based model that addresses the effec-
tive influence of surveys in orienting the opinions of voters before elections. The dynamics of
electoral consensus is studied as a function of time by investigating different possible scenarios
and the effect of periodic surveys, on the opinions of a small community of voters represented
as a network of agents connected by realistic social relationships. Our simulations show the
possibility to manage opinion consensus in electoral competitions.
Keywords: Opinion Dynamics, Agent-based models, Elections, Surveys.
1 Introduction
The relation between the news media and the electoral competition has attracted growing atten-
tion in literature quite recently, as shown in [43]. The way in which the information is provided
to the public may reflect a position with regard to parties or politicians. Thus, for example, [46]
propose a measure of political orientation by locating different media outlets on the political
spectrum on the basis of the similarity of the experts used by the media outlet and those cited by
members of Congress. There exist a relevant number of studies reporting correlations between
media usage and reported behavior as, among others, [26, 52, 24, 37, 51, 21, 29, 47].
A more recent paper by [48], compared the perception of the Iraq war of people who viewed
Fox News with those who did not, in order to show that the habit to follow some informative
channel can affect the perceptions of reported news. This raises a point, for people have the
tendency to seek out information that agrees with their pre-existing views. Such a conslusion has
been firstly documented long time ago, in [22] and then in [69]. However, more recently, some
theoretical work on the hypothesis that individuals adapt their choices about media sources
according to the similitude with their political perspective have been conduced by [55, 39].
Cited evidence shows that a sort of perverse reinforcing mechanism operates without helping
any improvement of knowledge and, instead, increasing the political discussion, as shown by
[53, 54].
Such a phenomenon has lead the recent literature on social communication to investigate
new methodologies, based on the concept of echo-chambers, in which a spontaneous clustering
emerges among people, as the result of a self-reinforcing preferential attachment dynamics. This
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process has been validly replicated on the internet, where both the chances of contacts among
people and the information sharing are increasingly relevant. Following the idea of “public
sphere” provided by [28], i.e. the communicative environment in which it is possible to circulate
ideas and information, some authors argue that the internet usage has boosted a passive people’s
exposure to the political debate, as shown for example, in [70] and in [23]. Some other authors
suggest, instead, that a selective mechanism operates for people surfing the web in a selective
manner, according to their a priori political views. In this case, then, an active choice would
operate in seeking the most appreciated information, as held for example, by [7, 49, 68]. This
debate is not being put forward here: what matters, for our purposes, is the evidence that
news media affect electoral participation of citizens, as shown by [67, 56, 64, 41, 63, 33], among
others. For example, as explained in [27], social networks may help in recognizing the political
orientation on the basis of the shared contents.
The strict relationship between informative campaigns, surveys and news management on
one side and the political orientation of the public on the other, operates thus similarly to
advertising for consumption activities. There emerges the chance to finely tune it, by means of
a series of stimuli induced to manage consensus. For example, it can be strategic to know to
which extent news media can affect the chances of incumbent politicians to be elected again, or
whether specific information provided can create competitive advantage for a type of politicians.
The debate on both points is still open. Empirical evidence does not support unambiguously a
direct or inverse causation effects, as shown in contributions by [62], [3, 41, 64, 33]. However,
an increase in provided information (in terms of number of news media) is shown to reduce the
advantage of incumbents and, thus, to increase both the turnover and the quality of politicians,
as in [6]. This should also reduce the chance to cover corruption, even if [38] and in [42] show
also the evidence that an increase in the supply of news media may lead to a negative effect on
electoral participation due to a crowding-out effect on the existing type of news media.
A more delicate point is shown by several authors: provided information is often far from
being objective, e.g., [45, 1, 4, 30]. More explicitly, [61] specifies that media lie about the news,
by choosing what to say and what to hide (see [2]), by selecting the timing of the news diffusion
(see [50]), by creating the context in which the information can implicitly suggest the desired
reaction, apparently spontaneous (see [40]). In [65, 66] it is addressed directly the existence of
a media bias, which descends from the way journalists gather information from their sources.
Such a dramatic result may derive from choices made by journalists themselves or their media
owners, as explained respectively in [5] and in [2], but also from eternal pressures exerted on
the media by politicians, as argued in [6], lobbies, as in [5, 65, 66, 57], or advertisers, as in
[35, 20, 44].
The main motivation of this paper is to show, by means of agent-based simulations, whether
and to which extent, the informative signals can effectively play a role in political competitions
among participating parties or coalitions. During these last years, agent-based models have been
extensively adopted in order to investigate emergent behavior and describe the implications of
complexity in several socio-economic phenomena as in [8, 19, 10, 17, 18, 11, 12, 13, 14, 9, 15,
16, 59, 58, 60] among many others.
Several scenarios will be presented to capture the influence of surveys - i.e. those statistical
investigations, based more or less explicitly on interviews, which reports the stated preference
a sample of voters during an electoral campaign. We propose a model which can rely on the
complexity of interactions among members of a small community, in order to refer to the rele-
vance of the effect of the media bias. These aspects have been only partially investigated. In
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particular they were empirically studied in the paper of [32], who analyzed the consequences of
the diffusion of Fox News in several US towns between 1996 and 2000 to show that between 3%
and %8 of Fox News’ viewers where induced to vote Republican. Other examples of such a rel-
evant branch of literature are, among others: [25] on the effects of US newspapers endorsement
of presidential candidates on voter behavior; [36] on the variation in the reception of the sole
Russian TV independent channel “NTV” to study the impact on the vote share of government
and opposition parties; [31] on the evidence showing that the reception of nationalistic Serbian
radios signal increases the vote share of extremist nationalistic parties in the neighboring Croa-
tian region; [34] on the effects on public television news programs in Italy after the electoral
victory of the coalition lead by Berlusconi in 2001.
The possibility to find some statistical regularities in the dynamics of the electoral campaigns
descending from a suitable management of news media is appealing for parties, but not only. The
political orientation of voters must be free and self-determined. The possibility that external
stimuli may play a hidden role is dangerous and should be carefully studied and eventually
regulated for a conscious and responsible use of the democratic mechanisms. The paper is
organized as follows: in section two, the model is presented; section three contains simulation
results and discussion; section four presents conclusive remarks.
2 The model
The goal of the present study is to show the effects of repeated and periodic public surveys on
the voting orientation of a relatively small community of people during a time interval of several
months before a political election. In this respect, we adopt a ”canonical ensemble” perspec-
tive, i.e. the test community we consider is only exposed to the surveys’ results, which report -
through different media channels - the voting intentions of a much larger population, and can
be only influenced by, but cannot influence, them. In this respect you can think, for example,
to the residents of a small village, or to a small Facebook community, which are periodically
informed by media about the general national political orientation.
Network description
The community we have in mind can be modeled as an undirected small-world network with
N nodes, where each node is an individual (agent), Ai (i = 1, ..., N), able to share information
with, on average, four neighbors, some of them linked with long range edges (see Fig.1). Such
a network topology, obtained from a regular 2D lattice, by means of a rewiring procedure with
probability pr = 0.02, ensures that the information flows quickly propagate through weak ties
through the system and reaches also agents far away from each other in terms of degree of sepa-
rations. At the same time, the existence of strong ties preserves necessary clustering properties
that characterize real social networks.
Agents description
Each node (i.e. each agent) of the network has a color indicating the political preference of that
agent for one of two parties, the Red party (red nodes) and the Blue party (blue nodes). Further,
a Yellow color characterizes an undecided agent whose preference is not oriented towards any of
the two parties and, therefore, corresponds to the non-voting intention at the elections (actually,
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Figure 1: An example of community represented by a small-world 2D lattice with N = 298
nodes. In the simulations we considered greater values for N . The different colors of the nodes
(red, blue, yellow) indicate the different opinions of the agents and correspond, respectively, to
individuals either voting Red party or voting Blue party or non-voting at all (undecided).
the Yellow color may indicate all the different positions - indifference, scarce interest, confusion -
which cannot be translated into a vote intention). Capital letters R, B and Y indicate the three
possible choices, corresponding to the described preferences and thus we define a status variable
Oi (i = 1, ..., N) assuming one of these values, for each agent. We also indicate with NR, NB
and NY the size (number of agents) of the three resulting groups, so that NR +NB +NY = N .
In our model each agent is characterized by two real variables, IRi and IBi (i = 1, ..., N),
which represent his/her own intensity of believing into, respectively, Red party or Blue party.
At the beginning of a simulation (t = 0), for agents who belong to one of the two parties, one
of these variables assumes a value selected, with uniform probability, in the interval [Imin, Imax]
(with Imin, Imax ∈ [0, 1] and Imin < Imax), while the other variable is set to zero. Of course,
an agent Ak belonging to Red party (Ok = R) will have IRk > 0 and IBk = 0; vice-versa, an
agent belonging to Blue party (Ok = B) will have IBk > 0 and IRk = 0. In both these cases,
depending on the value of IBk or IRk, the same agent could be also defined a strong believer
(for values close to 1) or a weak believer (for values close to 0) in the corresponding party. On
the other hand, a given undecided agents Ak (with Ok = Y ) will start with both IRk and IBk
randomly chosen in the interval [Imin, Imax].
During the simulation (t > 0), we assume that any agent Ak belonging to one of the two parties
can exert a different influence (social pressure) on his/her neighbors in order to induce them
to change opinion or, in case of indecision, to assume an opinion. We reasonably define such
a pressure as Pk = int[IRk ∗ 10] or Pk = int[IBk ∗ 10], depending on the status of the agent:
it is therefore represented by an integer number included in the interval [0, 10]. This means
that strong believers of a party will have a greater influence on their neighbors, whereas weak
believers will have only a little chance of convincing other people to change political preference
or to assume a new one.
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Opinion dynamics rules
The dynamics of opinions (voting intentions) is very simple: we assume that, at each discrete
time step t, an agent Ak - with a given status Ok - changes his/her preference or assumes a new
one depending on both the opinion and influence at time t − 1 of his/her neighbors {Nk} who
belong to a party and on his/her intensity of believing IRk or IBk. More precisely, we define
a vector Vk(t − 1) which contains the preferences Oj(t − 1) (i.e. the variables R and B) of the
neighbors Aj ∈ {Nk} at time t− 1 weighted by their influence. In other words, each preference
Oj will occur in the vector as many times as specified by the influence Ij of the corresponding
agent. Then, we randomly select one element v of this vector and we change the values of IRk
or IBk by distinguishing the following cases:
(i) If Ok = R and v = R, we increase the value of the variable IRk of a given quantity δI;
if Ok = R and v = B, we decrease the value of the variable IRk of the same quantity δI;
if, after this operation, IRk > 1 or IRk < 0, we set, respectively, IRk = 1 or IRk = 0; if
IRk = 0 we change the status of the agent Ak from Ok = R into the state Ok = B, then
we assign to the variable IBk a new random value in the interval [Imin, Imax] and we put
IRk = 0;
(ii) If Ok = B and v = B, we increase the value of the variable IBk of a given quantity δI;
if Ok = B and v = R, we decrease the value of the variable IBk of the same quantity δI;
if, after this operation, IBk > 1 or IBk < 0, we set, respectively, IBk = 1 or IBk = 0; if
IBk = 0 we change the status of the agent Ak from Ok = B into the state Ok = R, then
we assign to the variable IRk a new random value in the interval [Imin, Imax] and we put
IBk = 0;
(iii) If Ok = Y and v = R, we increase the value of the variable IRk of a given quantity δI/10;
if, after this operation, IRk ≥ 1, we change the status of the agent Ak into the new state
Ok = R, then we assign to the variable IRk a new random value in the interval [Imin, Imax]
and we put IBk = 0;
(iv) If Ok = Y and v = B, we increase the value of the variable IBk of the same quantity
δI/10; if, after this operation, IBk ≥ 1, we change the status of the agent Ak into the
new state Ok = B, then we assign to the variable IBk a new random value in the interval
[Imin, Imax] and we put IRk = 0; s
Notice that the opinions updating process is a parallel one: at each time step t all the agents
update simultaneously their opinion depending on the opinions of all his/her neighbors at t− 1
(therefore each agent can change his/her status only once during a given time step). Notice also
that undecided agents, not belonging to any party, cannot influence other agents but can be
induced by their neighbors to assume a position. This implies that their number will decrease
in time while the election day is approaching.
At the beginning of each simulation run, once fixed the number N of agents, one has to choose
the initial conditions for the status distribution. One choice could be assigning the status (color)
at random, with a uniform distribution, therefore obtaining more or less the same size (∼ N/3)
for the three groups (the two parties, red and blue, and the undecided component, yellow). An-
other choice is to assign again the colors at random among the agents, but fixing independently
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the initial sizes NR and NB of the two parties through the sliders, then obtaining the following
size for the undecided component: NY = N − (NR +NB). In order to better control the initial
advantage of a given party over the other one, we will usually prefer to adopt this second option.
Surveys description
As already explained, our goal is to simulate how, starting from a given (biased) initial con-
dition for the two parties, the opinion dynamics is affected by the results of a certain number
nS of subsequent (biased) surveys Sk (k = 1, 2, 3..., nS), which are external to the community
(”canonical ensemble” situation) and whose behavior follows different scenarios. Once fixed a
given party, say Blue party, and two thresholds, %min and %max, the scenarios we consider
are the following:
Scenario 1: Blue always prevailing in the surveys (with a percentage of preferences fluctuating
between %min and %max);
Scenario 2: Blue initially increasing (from %min to %max), then decreasing (from %max
to %min), in both cases with small random fluctuations;
Scenario 3: Blue always increasing, with small random fluctuations (from %min to %max).
Of course, in correspondence of a given percentage % of preferences for Blue party, the score
for Red party will be 100−%.
The surveys occur with a certain periodicity during the time interval [0, TE ], being TE the total
simulation time, coincident with the final ”election day”. Typically, we will fix TE = 4000 time
steps, each one corresponding to one hour of real time: the global duration of the electoral
campaign is therefore 4000h, i.e. 166 days, i.e. five and half months, approximately. The time
interval among subsequent surveys is randomly chosen in the range TS − 24h, Ts + 24h, centered
around the value TS so that, on average, nS = TE/TS .
After a survey Sk, the scores of the selected scenario will be stored in two variables nR(Sk) and
nB(Sk). Furthermore, the ”trend” evolution of these two preferences components are shown,
i.e. the two differences:
dR(Sk) = nR(Sk)− nR(Sk−1)
dB(Sk) = nB(Sk)− nB(Sk−1)
(1)
The sign of each difference in eq.(1) will indicate whether the trend for the corresponding
component is positive or negative (and their value will indicate its strength). An initial survey
at t = 0 (S0) is performed in order to show resulting trends since the first survey S1 after the
first TS time steps.
The model allows to focus a fundamental point, which is the reaction of people to the survey’s
results (we assume that results are immediately advertised by mass media). It is worth to notice
that we assume that mass media, normally stress only information about scores and trends of
the two parties, while the score of the undecided people, which in our model is surely decreasing
in time, should be considered actually without any effect.
We also assume that the supporters of a given party will reinforce their opinion after a favorable
survey, while the supporters of the survey-loosing party could either increase or decrease their
convincement depending on their personal characterization (i.e. if they are either strong or
weak believers). On the other hand, also the undecided agents could increase their propensity
to become believers depending on the score of the two parties. Thus, the reaction to a survey is
modeled as it follows.
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After knowing the result of a survey Sk:
- all the agents belonging to the party with the best score (the red party if nR(Sk) > nB(Sk),
the blue one in the opposite case) will increase their IRi or IBi of the quantity δS, i.e. they will
reinforce their believing; tipically, δS is greater than δI and linearly increases with the difference
between the scores of the two parties, i.e. δS = δSmin + βS |nR(Sk)− nB(Sk)|;
- at the same time, all the agents belonging to the loosing party, will increase their corresponding
intensity (IRi or IBi) of the same quantity δS with probability IRi or IBi, or will decrease
their corresponding intensity with probability 1− IRi or 1− IBi;
- finally, all the undecided agents, will increase of the quantity δS the intensity (IRi or IBi)
corresponding to the party with the best score.
An analogous procedure is then repeated, for all the agents and at the same time step, by
comparing the trends dR(Sk) and dB(Sk) of the two parties:
- if dR(Sk) > 0 and dB(Sk) < 0, the red agents and the undecided agents will increase their IRi
of the quantity δSmin (i.e. in this case the increment does not depend on the difference between
the scores of the two parties), while the blue agents either will increase their IBi of the quantity
δSmin with probability IBi or will decrease it with probability 1− IBi;
- if dB(Sk) > 0 and dR(Sk) < 0, the blue agents and the undecided agents will increase their
IBi of the quantity δSmin, while the blue agents either will increase their IRi of the quantity
δSmin with probability IRi or will decrease it with probability 1− IRi;
In such a way, in response of each survey, the values of IRi or IBi of all the agents will slightly
change and this could induce, at the next time step, a rearrangement of their status Oi.
At the end of each simulation (i.e. at t = TE), all the agents are called to participate at final
elections. Of course, undecided agents will not vote. But also the supporters of the two parties
do not participate with certainty at the elections: actually, they will go to the polling station
only with a probability, which is directly proportional to their conviction (i.e. to their influence,
which is equal to IRi or IBi). Therefore, in general, the final election scores for the two parties
will be lower than the corresponding voting preferences at t = TE , i.e. there will be always
a given number of non voting people (abstainers) higher than the final number of undecided
people.
3 Results of the simulations
In this section we present the results of the simulations for one single typical event. We show
the expected time behavior of opinion dynamics for a test community with a biased voting
orientation, either in presence or in absence of surveys (biased in the opposite way), and, in
the latter case, its dependence on the adopted surveys scenario. Immediately after, we present
the results of multi-event simulations, in order to extract some statistical evidence about the
influence of surveys on the elections result.
3.1 Single-event simulations
We adopted the following setup for the control parameters for a typical simulation of one event:
- Number of agents: N = 900;
- Fixed size, Red biased, initial conditions: NR = 360 (40%), NB = 315 (35%) and NY = 225;
- Extreme values for the initial believing distribution: Imin = 0.10 and Imax = 0.50;
- Variation parameter for believing: δI = 0.002;
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Figure 2: Top panel: initial configuration (at t = 0) of our test community with N = 900
agents. The different colors of the agents (red, blue or yellow) indicates, respectively, if a given
individual, at the beginning of the simulation, is a believer of the Red party or of the Blue
party or if the voter is still undecided. In this simulation setup the Red party always starts
with a slight advantage (40%) over the Bue party (35%). Bottom panels: final configuration (at
t = TE) of the same community at the end of four simulations with different surveys scenarios:
(a) No-surveys Scenario: Red party prevails; (b) Scenario 1: Blue party prevails; (c) Scenario 2:
Red party prevails; (d) Scenario 3: Red party prevails.
- Minimum variation parameter for the reactions to the surveys: δSmin = 0.01;
- Linear coefficient for the reactions to the surveys: βS = 0.001;
- Total simulation time, coincident with the ”election day”: TE = 4000 hours;
- Average time interval among subsequent surveys: TS = 168 hours (1 week);
In order to test the typical effects of the three surveys’ scenarios on the election results, it is
useful to compare several single-event simulations realized by using exactly the same topology
for the small-world community, reported in the top panel of Fig.2, and starting from exactly the
same initial conditions (at t = 0), with a slight advantage of the Red party over the Blue party.
Before giving the details of each simulation, if we consider the bottom panels of Fig.2 and
compare panel (a) - no-surveys scenario - with panels (b),(c) and (d), we immediately notice
that the presence of surveys has three macroscopic effects on the final opinion distribution: (i)
the reinforcement of the echo chambers, i.e. the accentuation of the spontaneous clustering of
(red or blue) voting intentions which emerges among people due to the opinion dynamics; (ii)
the consequent decrease of non-voting (yellow) people, who are normally located along the edges
of opinion clusters; (iii) the ability to subvert, sometimes, the elections result (of course limited
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Figure 3: Single-event No-surveys Scenario. Top panel: initial distribution (at t = 0) of the
believing intensities for the two parties. Middle panel: final distribution of believing intensities
(at t = TE). Bottom panel: time behavior of both the number of individuals voting for the two
parties (red and blue) and the number of undecided (yellow).
to the test community), as in the case of scenario 1 where, at variance with the no-surveys
scenario, Blue party prevails.
No-surveys Scenario
Let us start with the presentation of the time evolution of both believing and voting intentions
in the no-surveys scenario.
In the top and the middle panels of Fig.3 we first show, respectively, the initial and final distri-
butions of the believing in the two parties for the 900 agents of the test community: starting at
t = 0 from their initial uniform values between [0.1, 0.5], the believing intensities for both the
Red and the Blue parties evolve in time until, at the end of the simulation (i.e. at t = TE) they
reach a power-law like shape, with a pronounced peak in correspondence of their maximum al-
lowed unitary value. In the bottom panel of Fig.3 it is shown the corresponding time behavior of
the voting preferences for the three social components of the community: it clearly appears that,
in absence of surveys, the initial slight numerical advantage of the Red party becomes stronger
and stronger, in particular during the last two months when the undecided people, feeling the
pressure of the incoming elections, start to assume a voting preference. Finally, at t = TE (elec-
tions day), the Red party component has reached NR(TE) = 53%, against a NB(TE) = 32% of
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Figure 4: Single-event Surveys Scenarios. Top panels: the time behavior of both the number of
individuals voting for the two parties (red and blue) and the number of undecided (yellow) is
shown for the three Surveys Scenarios considered. Bottom panels: the scores of the two parties
for each one of the nS = 24 Surveys (one per week, in average) is reported for the three Scenarios
considered.
the Blue party one and a NY (TE) = 15% of undecided. Then, following the rules of the model,
the final distributions of believing translate into probabilities of going to the polling station for
the Red and Blue components while, of course, the undecided component do not vote at all.
Therefore, the elections result are the following: total percentage of voters 80.3%, score of the
Red party 62.4%, score of the Blue party 37.6%. Comparing these values with the final compo-
sition of the voting preferences, we observe that the percentage of abstainers (19.7%) is higher
than that of the undecided component (15%): this means that some of the weak believers of the
two parties did not go to the polling station. However, Red party still maintain its advantage
and prevails at the elections.
Surveys Scenarios
Let us consider, now, the three scenarios with surveys.
In the top panels of Fig.4, the time evolution of the voting preferences for the three components
of the test community is reported for each one of the three surveys scenarios. In the bottom
panels of the same figure, the corresponding scores of the two parties within each surveys scenario
is reported for comparison. It clearly appears that only in Scenario 1, due to effect of the biased
surveys score of the Blue party which is always over that one of the Red party (fluctuating
between 54% and 58%), the Blue party is able to recover its initial disadvantage and to prevails
at the elections: in this case, the percentage of voting people is 90.9% - 48.9% for Red party,
51.1% for Blue party - and that of abstainers is 9.1%. In the other two scenarios, the effects
of the biased surveys are not relevant and the Red party remains always prevailing, like in the
no-surveys case: in Scenario 2 (where the surveys score of the Blue party starts at 30%, initially
goes up until 70%, then goes down again towards 40%) the percentage of voting people is 93.1%
- 56.8% for Red party, 43.2% for Blue party -, while in Scenario 3 (where the surveys score of
10
Figure 5: Multi-event Surveys Scenario 1. In the diagram on the left are reported 5000 points,
each one corresponding to a single-event simulation, colored in blue or in red depending on the
party prevailing at the elections, as function of both the initial biased advantage AR of the Red
party in the percentage of believers (x-axis) and the biased average advantage AB of the Blue
party in the surveys score (y-axis). In the four panels on the right, the number of wins for the
Blue party (upper panels) and the Red party (bottom panels) are also reported as function of
AR (left column) and AB (right column).
the Blue party starts at 40%, overtakes that of the Red party at the surpass time tS and slowly
goes up until 70%) the percentage of voting people is 88.9% - 55.4% for Red party, 44.6% for
Blue party.
In conclusion, as already observed, even if sometimes it is not enough to overturn the initial
bias (of 5%) in favor of the Red party, the introduction of surveys has always the effect of
reducing the percentage of abstainers (by increasing the average believing of people) and of
reinforcing the clustering of preferences into separated echo-chambers. On the other hand, it
seems that a constant advantage in the surveys score (like in Scenario 1, where an average
advantage of 56 − 44 = 12% has been considered) is strictly necessary to the Blue party for
having a chance to prevail at the elections in a community initially biased in favor of the Red
party. But, how the magnitude of such an advantage does affect the elections results? And how
these results are also affected by the range of variation of the surveys scores for the Blue party in
Scenarios 2 and 3? In order to answer to these questions, and to obtain results more significant
from a statistical point of view, in the next section we will perform a parametric analysis of the
model by means of systematic multi-event simulations.
3.2 Multi-event simulations
Let us start by exploring how the probability for the Blue party of overturning the initial
disadvantage in terms of preferences with respect to the Red party in the context of Scenario 1
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does depend on both the initial biased advantage in the percentage of believers of the Red party
(AR) and on the biased average advantage of the Blue party in the surveys score (AB).
In the left diagram of Fig.5, the results of 5000 different single-event simulations (with the
same setup of the control parameters described in the previous section) are reported as colored
points uniformly distributed as function of these two quantities (AR in the x-axis and AB in the
y-axis): the color of each point indicates the party that won the elections in the corresponding
event. In the four panels on the right, the number of wins for the Blue party and the Red party
are reported separately, as function of AR (left column) and AB (right column) respectively.
It is evident that, as one could expects, increasing the initial believing advantage AR of Red
party (from 1% to 15%) makes more difficult for the Blue party to overtake it and to prevail at
the elections, while increasing its average advantage AB in the survey score (from 6% to 20%)
makes the victory of Blue party easier (in any case, if AR < 2% the Blue party always prevails at
the elections, no matter its survey advantage). The inclined white line reported in the diagram
helps the eye to appreciate this effect: to the left of this line the chance of prevailing of the
Blue party is greater than that of the Red party, to the right the opposite holds. Notice that
the single-event result where the Blue party won the elections in the survey Scenario 1 with
AR = 5% and AB = 12%, discussed in the previous section and shown in Fig.3, is consistent
with this picture (the point AR = 5% and AB = 12% is indicated with a yellow diamond in the
left diagram of Fig.4).
In order to visualize in a different way the variation in the chance of prevailing of the Blue
party as function of AR and AB, in Fig.6 we add a third z-axis to the diagram of Fig.5: in this
axis the difference DBR between the number of votes taken by the Blue party at the elections
and those taken by the Red party is reported as a proxy of the probability of prevailing of
the Blue party. A color scale for the z variable, going from Red (for DBR < 0) to Blue (for
DBR > 0), applied to the single-event points, helps the eye to appreciate both the decrease of
that probability along the AR axis and the increase along the AB axis.
Let us now to go to the multi-event analysis of the other two surveys scenarios, starting with
Scenario 2.
As already shown in Fig.4, Scenario 2 provides that the surveys score of the Blue party starts
at 30%, initially goes up until 70%, then goes down again. In this scenario, the surveys give the
Blue party as leading party only in the central part of the single-event simulation, while the Red
party results to be in advantage at the beginning and at the end of the time period considered.
Once fixed this range of variation for the surveys score, and adopting again the same setup of
parameters of the previous section, we perform a multi-event simulation with 2000 events, each
one with a different value for the initial advantage AR of the Red party but leaving it to be also
negative (−10 < AR < 10): this means that now the initial bias in the composition of believing
of the test community can also be in favor of the Blue party (when AR < 0).
In the diagram shown in Fig.7, we report the points corresponding to the 2000 single-event
simulations of Scenario 2 as function of the AR value (x-axis) and also of the difference DBR
between the number of votes taken by the Blue party and those taken by the Red party at
the elections (y-axis). As usual, the points are colored in blue or in red depending on the
party prevailing at the elections. Of course, in this case all the points above the x-axis (i.e.
with DBR > 0) will be blue while those below the x-axis will be red. The distribution of the
points in the diagram clearly indicates that the elections winner strictly depends on the initial
advantage in the number of believers: by increasing AR, such an advantage will be more and
more consolidated by the opinion dynamics during the simulations and the initially favored party
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Figure 6: Multi-event Surveys Scenario 1. In this 3D diagram the same 5000 single-event points
of the previous figure are plotted as function of AR, AB and DBR. The latter, reported in the
z-axis, is the difference between the number of votes taken by the Blue party at the elections
and those taken by the Red party, and it is here used as a proxy of the probability of prevailing
of the Blue party. The shades of color from Red to Blue helps to better appreciate the position
of the points along the z-axis.
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Figure 7: Multi-event Surveys Scenario 2. In the diagram are reported 2000 points, each one
corresponding to a single-event simulation, colored in blue or in red depending on the party
prevailing at the elections, as function of both the initial biased advantage AR of the Red party
in the percentage of believers (x-axis) and the difference DBR between the number of votes taken
by the Blue party at the elections and those taken by the Red party (y-axis). In the insets, the
number of wins for the Blue party (upper panel) and the Red party (bottom panel) are also
reported as function of AR.
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Figure 8: Multi-event Surveys Scenario 3. In the diagram are reported 2000 points, each one
corresponding to a single-event simulation, colored in blue or in red depending on the party
prevailing at the elections, as function of both the initial biased advantage AR of the Red party
in the percentage of believers (x-axis) and the difference DBR between the number of votes taken
by the Blue party at the elections and those taken by the Red party (y-axis). In the insets, the
number of wins for the Blue party (upper panel) and the Red party (bottom panel) are also
reported as function of AR.
shall prevail at the elections with higher probability.
Anyway, the effects of the surveys is slightly asymmetric for the two parties: actually, from
the details of the histograms shown in the two insets, where the number of wins as function of
AR is reported for the two parties, it results that the 23.5% of the Blue party wins (over a total
of 1090) occur when it starts from disadvantageous initial conditions, i.e. when AR > 0, against
11.3% of the Red party wins (over a total of 910) for AR < 0. This means that it seems more
convenient for a party to be favored by the surveys scores (with an increasing trend) in the first
half of the election campaign rather than in the second part, provided that the duration of its
central leading time period is quite wide. Notice also that, for a given value of AR, the spreading
of DBR along the y-axis is quite large, i.e. the gap of votes between the winning and the losing
party can assume many different values, just linked to the duration of the central leading time
period.
An analogous effect appears also in the case of the Scenario 3 (again with the same setup of
the previous section), where the surveys score of the Blue party starts at 40%, but immediately
increases and, after overtaking the Red party at a given time tS , slowly goes up until 70% (see
Fig.4). In fact, the results of the multi-event analysis reported in Fig.8, consisting again of 2000
events, show that the 21.2% of the Blue party wins (over a total of 1197, more than those of
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Figure 9: Multi-event Surveys Scenario 3. Behavior of the surpass time tS as function of the
election results difference DBR for both the Red (DBR < 0) and Blue (DBR > 0) parties.
Scenario 2) occur when it starts from disadvantageous initial conditions (AR > 0), against only
5.5% of the Red party wins (over a total of 803) for AR < 0: this implies that when the Blue
party starts with adverse surveys but then surpasses the Red party showing a constant positive
survey trend, its total number of wins increases with respect to the Scenario 2, in particular (of
course) when AR < 0 (the number of wins when AR > 0 remains more or less the same as in
the Scenario 2). Furthermore, the spreading of DBR along the y-axis for each value of AR is
reduced with respect to the previous scenario.
In this scenario it is also interesting to see how the surpass time tS influences the election
result. In Fig.9, where the surpass time is plotted as function of the usual difference DBR
between the number of votes taken by the Blue party and those taken by the Red party, we
may notice that the value of the average surpass time < tS > is lower when the Blue party
prevails at the elections (51.6 against 61.2): this means that the probability for the Blue party
of overturning the initial disadvantage and winning the electoral competition within is higher
when the surpass in the surveys happens quite soon. In particular, the gap DBR > 0 between
the votes of Blue party and those of the Red party is maximum when tS < 30 days, i.e. when
the surpass falls within the first month (simmetrically, when tS falls near the election day TE ,
the gap is also quite high but in favor of the Red party - i.e. DBR < 0).
4 Conclusions
We have presented an agent-based model on a small-world realistic topology that should be able
to capture the effective influence of surveys in orienting the opinions of voters before elections.
The dynamics of electoral consensus was investigated by considering different scenarios with
two coalitions/parties and a third group of undecided voters (but, of course, the model could
be be easily extended to more than two parties). We have shown that the effect of periodic
public surveys on the opinions of a relatively small community of agents, if compared with an
identical situation but without surveys, is twofold: on one hand, surveys do reinforce the so
called ’echo chambers’, i.e. accentuate the spontaneous clustering of voting intentions emerging
among people due to the opinion dynamics; on the other hand, they can change the final
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electoral result (of course limited to the considered community) and let the party, that otherwise
would lose, to win the electoral competition at the end of the examined period. Of course, the
proposed theoretical model would need to be supported with real data in order to calibrate
the internal parameters and become possibly a reliable predictive model after the experimental
validation of the initial assumptions. In this respect, the surveys’ scenarios considered in this
paper are just examples to show the effectiveness of this methodology. In fact, we think that
this kind of analysis could suggest possible strategies in order to manage and investigate in
detail the formation of electoral consensus in political competitions. In practice, by knowing the
voting intentions of a community at the beginning of the trial period and the external survey
scenario during a large portion of the same period, our model can possibly infer (with a certain
probability) the final distribution of votes in the community.
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